Abstract. This paper studies and bounds the effects of approximating loss functions and credal sets on choice functions, under very weak assumptions. In particular, the credal set is assumed to be neither convex nor closed. The main result is that the effects of approximation can be bounded, although in general, approximation of the credal set may not always be practically possible. In case of pairwise choice, I demonstrate how the situation can be improved by showing that only approximations of the extreme points of the closure of the convex hull of the credal set need to be taken into account, as expected.
Introduction
Classical decision theory tells a decision maker to choose that option which maximises his expected utility. A generalisation of this principle is compelling when the probabilities and utilities relevant to the problem are not well known. Choice functions are one such generalisation, and select a set of optimal options: instead of pointing to a single solution based on possibly wrong assumptions, choice functions provide a set of optimal options. The decision maker can then investigate further if the set is too large, or not, if for instance the optimal set is a singleton, or if a single option from the set stands out from the rest by other arguments.
However, in modelling decision problems, we often afford ourselves the luxury of infinite spaces and infinite sets, making those problems sometimes hard to solve analytically. In such cases we must resort to computers, and these cannot handle random variables on infinite spaces, let alone arbitrary infinite sets of probabilities. Hence, in that case we must approximate our infinite sets by finite ones. By taking the finite sets sufficiently large, hopefully the approximation reflects the true result accurately. This paper confirms this intuition when modelling choice functions induced by arbitrary (not necessarily convex) sets of probabilities and a single cardinal utility, extending similar results known in classical decision theory [5, 11] .
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces notation, and briefly reviews the theory of coherent choice functions and their role in decision theory. In Section 3 the building blocks for a theory of approximation are introduced, along with some useful results on what they imply for loss functions, sets of probabilities, and expected utility. The main part of the paper begins in Section 4, studying and bounding the effects of approximation on coherent choice functions. Section 5 improves the results of the previous section for pairwise choice. Section 6 concludes the paper. Some essential but technical results on approximating the standard simplex in R denoted by P , Q, . . . and P(Ω) denotes the set of all probability charges on the power set ℘(Ω) of Ω.
In a decision problem, we desire to choose an optimal option d from a set D of options. Choosing d induces an uncertain reward r from a set R of rewards, with probability charge µ d (·|w) over ℘(R), depending on the outcome of the uncertain state w ∈ Ω. For each w ∈ Ω, µ d (·|w) is a lottery over R, and as a function of w, µ d (·|·) : w → µ d (·|w) is a horse lottery or act.
If we model our belief about states and rewards by a probability charge P on ℘(Ω) and a state dependent utility function U (·|w) on R, then utility theory [17, 1, 4] tells us to choose a decision d which maximises the expected utility, or prevision:
where
is the gamble associated with decision d, and the integrals are Dunford integrals [2] . For simplicity, in this paper, we assume U (r|w) to be bounded, i.e. sup r,w
Among other things, this ensures that relative approximation can be defined, as in Section 3, without technical complications. A decision which maximises expected utility is called a Bayes decision for the decision problem (Ω, D, P, U ).
However, if we are not sure about the probability of all events and the utility of all rewards, a more reliable design is to use a family (P α , U α ) α∈ℵ of probability-utility pairs (where ℵ is an arbitrary index set), and to elicit from D those options which maximise expected utility with respect to at least one of the pairs (P α , U α ). First, for each α ∈ ℵ, let
is the gamble associated with decision d and model α ∈ ℵ. Then we define:
As such, the operator opt selects a set of optimal decisions, namely all decisions which are Bayes with respect to (Ω, D, P α , U α ) for at least one α ∈ ℵ. Such an operator is called a choice function or optimality operator [3, 16] .
In case (P α , U α ) α∈ℵ = M × U for some convex sets M and U, optimality as defined above is also called E-admissibility [9, Sec. 4.8] .
There are many ways to define a choice function starting from a set (P α , U α ) α∈ℵ (see [9, 14, 18, 8, 16] ). The one in Definition 1 satisfies an interesting set of axioms [8, 13] , and is the subject of a representation theorem in case utility is precise and state independent (i.e. if U α (r|w) depends neither on α nor on w) and Ω is finite (for infinite Ω the representation theorem is subject to additional constraints, which preclude merely finitely additive probabilities over Ω) [13] .
For the sake of simplicity, we shall only be concerned about decision problems with precise and state independent utility functions, i.e. when (P α , U α ) α∈ℵ = M × {U } with U : R → R a bounded state independent utility over R and
The set M is called a credal set as it represents our belief about w ∈ Ω. We can identify M itself as index set, and write
Finally, defining the loss function L :
, the expected value E P (d) is uniquely determined by P and L alone: we need not be concerned explicitly with R, µ d (r|w), and U (r).
Approximate Gambles, Probabilities, and Previsions
Let A = {A 1 , . . . , A n } denote a finite partition of Ω. As we approximate Ω by the finite set A, we also need to approximate decisions, gambles, and probability charges on Ω.
Let
Note that f ∼ ǫf implies af + b ∼ ǫ af + b, for any real numbers a and b, a > 0. Therefore, the relation ∼ ǫ is invariant with respect to positive linear transformations of utility: it only depends on our preferences over lotteries, and not on our particular choice of utility scale. For a probability charge P in P(Ω), and a probability chargeP in P(A), we shall write P ∼ ǫP if
Note that this implies |P (A) −P (A)| ≤ ǫ for any A ∈ ℘(A). Also note the differences between the definitions of ∼ ǫ for gambles and bounded charges.
For a loss function L on D × Ω and a loss functionL on D × A we write L ∼ ǫL if for all
For a subset M of P(Ω) and a subsetM of P(A), we write M ∼ ǫM if for every P in M there is aP inM such that P ∼ ǫP , and for everyP inM there is a P in M such that P ∼ ǫP .
A few useful results about approximations are stated in the next lemmas. Proof. Consider any d in D, and let
The sets A 1 , . . . , A k defined by Lemma 2) .
The finite collection of partitions {A d : d ∈ D} has a smallest common refinement A. Since each A d has no more than 1 + 1/ǫ elements, A has no more than (1 + 1/ǫ) |D| elements. Indeed, two partitions of cardinalities k 1 and k 2 respectively have a smallest common refinement of cardinality no more than k 1 k 2 . By induction, n partitions of cardinalities k 1 , . . . , k n have a smallest common refinement of cardinality no more than n j=1 k j and hence, |A| ≤ (1 + 1/ǫ) |D| Table 1 Proof. Consider any P in M. Let n = |A| and let the elements of A be A 1 , . . . , A n . Consider the vector x = (P (A 1 ), . . . , P (A n )) in ∆ n . Let N be the smallest natural number such that N ≥ n/δ. By Lemma 13 in the appendix, there is a vector y in ∆ Table 2 . Upper bound on log 10 (|M|), i.e. the logarithm of the cardinality of the finite set of probability chargesM, for various values of precision δ > 0 and cardinality of the partition |A| (see Lemma 3) .
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}-by finite additivity,P is well defined on ℘(A). By construction, P ∼ δP because
Approximating each P in M in this manner, the set
is finite as each of its elements corresponds to an element of the finite set ∆ n N , and therefore |M| ≤ |∆ n N |. By Lemma 12 in the appendix,
The second inequality follows from the fact that a b is strictly increasing in a, for fixed b (for integer a and b this follows immediately from Pascal's triangle; the general case follows from the properties of the Gamma function). Table 2 lists upper bounds on the cardinality ofM on a logarithmic scale, for some values of |A| and δ. The cardinality grows enormously fast with increasing |A| and 1/δ. Within the range of Table 2 , an exponential trend is obvious. The table shows that the influence of |A| is much larger than the influence of δ: more precisely, doubling |A| increases |M| by far more than halving δ.
Next, we study the effect on the expectation if both gambles and probabilities are approximated. Let us use the notation E P (f ) = Ω f (w) dP (w). In the lemma below, assume 0 < ǫ < 1/2.
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Lemma 4. For every finite partition A of Ω, every f ∈ L(Ω),f ∈ L(A), P ∈ P(Ω), and P ∈ P(A), the following implications hold. If f ∼ ǫf and P ∼ δP then
and
Proof. Let R = sup f − inf f ,R = supf − inff , and write inf A f for inf w∈A f (w) and sup A f for sup w∈A f (w). Then
and since Let us now investigate what is the most optimal choice for ǫ > 0 and δ > 0. The cardinality ofM is of largest concern as it grows enormously fast with increasing cardinality of the finite partition A and with increasing precision 1/δ (see Table 2 ). Therefore, as a first step, let us see how we can minimise |M|, assuming a fixed relative error ǫ + δ on the expectation (see Lemma 4)-omitting higher order terms in ǫ and δ to simplify the analysis.
We wish to minimise the upper bound (neglecting lower order terms) Figure 1 demonstrates a typical case: the ǫ-δ-ratio has a large impact on the upper bound of |M|. In particular, the curve grows extremely large for small ǫ, because a small ǫ corresponds to a large partition A, and the cardinality of the partition has a huge impact on the cardinality of M as shown in Table 2 .
Approximate Choice
Let us now consider again the decision problem (Ω, D, M, L) with state space Ω, decision space D, credal set M, and loss function L, and reflect upon how the results in the previous section could be of use in finding the optimal decisions opt(Ω, D, M, L). Can we still find the optimal decisions after approximating the loss function L and the set of probabilities M?
As we admit a relative error on gambles and probabilities, and therefore also on previsions, we should admit a relative error on the choice function as well. Let R D be defined by (recall that
for any real numbers a and b, a > 0. In other words, opt ǫ (Ω, D, M, L) is invariant with respect to positive linear transformations of utility: ǫ-optimality does not depend on our choice of utility scale.
Clearly,
whenever ǫ ≤ δ, and opt
In approximating a decision problem (Ω, D, M, L), we start with a finite partition A, consider a (possibly finite) setM such that M ∼ δM , and approximate the loss
for some P ∈ M. LetP be such that P ∼ δP . Because, by Lemma 4,
and again by Lemma 4,
and by Eq. (3),
Because, by Lemma 4,
we have that 
If we ignore higher order terms in γ, ǫ, and δ, then the above theorem says that when moving from an original decision problem to an approximate decision problem, or the other way around, with relative error ǫ in gambles and relative error δ in probabilities, the relative error in optimality increases by 2(ǫ + δ). For example, for small ǫ and δ the following holds, up to a small error: if
So, the approximate problem with relative error 2(ǫ + δ) will contain all solutions to the original problem with no relative error, and will, so to speak, not contain any solutions to the original problem with relative error over 4(ǫ + δ). Because of this property, opt 2(ǫ+δ) (A, D,M,L) seems a logical choice when solving decision problems in practice. Table 2 reveals that the size of the credal set is a serious computational bottleneck. Therefore, it is worth investigating how the size ofM can be reduced, without compromising the accuracy δ > 0. One way to this end is to restrict to pairwise comparisons, i.e. using maximality (see Walley [18, Sec. 3.7-3.9]).
Pairwise Choice

Maximality. Definition 7. A decision d ∈ D is called a maximal decision for the decision problem
Denote by co(M) the convex hull of M. Obviously it holds that
because for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and any two P and Q in M, the inequalities E P (d) ≥ E P (e) and E Q (d) ≥ E Q (e) imply the inequality
This does not hold for optimality as defined in Definition 1: assuming Ω finite, for any two distinct subsets M and M ′ of P(Ω), we can always find a set D and a loss function L such that However, because
, an approximation which discards all preferences but the pairwise ones.
Let us admit a relative error on the choice function max as well. Recall,
2. Approximating Extreme Points. It turns out that we can restrict our attention to the extreme points of the closure of the convex hull of M, with respect to the topology of pointwise convergence on members of L(Ω). This topology is characterised by the following notion of convergence: for every directed set (A, ≤) and every net (P α ) α∈A , we have that lim α P α = P if
Without further mention, I will assume this topology on P(Ω). See for instance [12] for more information regarding nets [12, Chapter 7] and this topology [12, §28.15] .
There is a nice connection between the closure of M, denoted by cl(M), and ǫ-optimality and ǫ-maximality.
, the following equality holds:
and if additionally D is finite, then the following equality holds as well:
Proof. We start with proving Eq. (7).
Consider any e ∈ D. By assumption, there is a P ∈ cl(M) such that E P (e) − E P (d) ≤ R D ǫ. Because P ∈ cl(M), there is a net (P α ∈ M) α∈A such that lim α E Pα (f ) = E P (f ) for all gambles f . It follows that lim α E Pα (e) − lim α E Pα (d) ≤ R D ǫ. This implies that for every δ > 0, there is an α ∈ A such that E Pα (e) − E Pα (f ) ≤ (ǫ + δ)R D .
So, for every δ > 0, there is a P ∈ M such that E P (e) − E P (f ) ≤ (ǫ + δ)R D . Whence, because this holds for any e ∈ D, d ∈ max
Consider any e ∈ D. Then, for all δ > 0, there is a P δ ∈ M such that E P δ (e) − E P δ (f ) ≤ (ǫ + δ)R D . Hence, for all n ∈ N, there is a P n ∈ M such that
For any m ∈ N, consider the following closed subset of P(Ω):
The collection {R m : m ∈ N} satisfies the finite intersection property. By the Banach-AlaogluBourbaki theorem [12, §28.29(UF26)] P(Ω) is compact, and hence
is non-empty as well [12, §17.2] . Take any R ∈ R. Since each P n ∈ M, it follows that each R m ⊆ cl(M), and hence R ∈ cl(M). If we can show that
and therefore by Eq. (9), E R (e) − E R (d) ≤ 1/n α + ǫR D + γ. Because this inequality holds for every m and every γ > 0, and n α ≥ m, it follows that
Let us now prove Eq. (8), under the additional assumption that D is finite. The proof goes along similar lines as the one for Eq. (7).
Because P ∈ cl(M), there is a net (P α ∈ M) α∈A such that lim α E Pα (f ) = E P (f ) for all gambles f . In particular, there is a net (P α ∈ M) α∈A such that lim α E Pα (e) − lim α E Pα (d) ≤ R D ǫ for every e ∈ D. So, for every e ∈ D and δ > 0, there is an α e,δ ∈ A such that E Pα (e) − E Pα (f ) ≤ (ǫ + δ)R D for all α ≥ α e,δ . Because D is finite, there is an α δ such that α δ ≥ α e,δ for all e ∈ D. Hence, for every δ > 0, there is a α δ ∈ A such that
Hence, for all n ∈ N, there is a P n ∈ M such that for every e ∈ D (10)
Similarly as before, it can be established that R is non-empty and that R ∈ cl(M). If we can show that
, L) and the desired result is established.
Indeed, because R ∈ cl({P n : n ≥ m}), for every e ∈ D, there is a net (P nα,e ) α∈A in {P n : n ≥ m}-so n α,e ≥ m-such that lim α E Pn α,e (f e − f d ) = E R (f e − f d ). Hence, for every e ∈ D and every γ > 0, there is an α ∈ A such that E R (e) − E R (d) ≤ E Pn α,e (e) − E Pn α,e (d) + γ, and therefore by Eq. (10), E R (e) − E R (d) ≤ 1/n α,e + ǫR D + γ. Because this inequality holds for every m and every γ > 0, and n α,e ≥ m, it follows that E R (e) − E R (d) ≤ ǫR D for every e ∈ D.
In particular, assuming R D > 0, if for any δ > ǫ > 0
A similar result holds for the opt ǫ operator for finite D. As a special case, Lemma 9 implies an interesting connection between maximality and ǫ-maximality:
Again, a similar result holds for optimality and ǫ-optimality, in case D is finite.
In the following theorem, assume that 0 < ǫ < 1/2.
and by convexity of cl(co(M)) [12, §26.23 ] and the Krein-Milman theorem [6, p. 74] , the closed convex hull of ext(cl(co(M))) is cl(co(M)), so
and now by Corollary 10,
Now apply the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 6 to recover Eq. (11). To establish Eq. (12), again use the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 6,
and again by the Krein-Milman theorem [6, p. 74] , the closed convex hull of ext(cl(co(M))) is cl(co(M)), so
Again, if we ignore higher order terms in γ, ǫ, and δ, then the above theorem says that when moving from the original decision problem to the approximate decision problem, with relative error ǫ in gambles and relative error δ in probabilities, the relative error in maximality increases by 2(ǫ + δ). Hence, for small ǫ and δ the following holds, up to a small error: if L ∼ ǫL and ext(cl(co(M))) ∼ δM , then
Again, max 2(ǫ+δ) (A, D,M,L) seems a logical choice when calculating maximal decisions in practice.
Conclusion and Remarks
With this paper, I hope to have consolidated at least part of our every day intuition when approximating decision problems involving sets of probabilities, for instance when those problems have to be solved by computer.
One result is quite depressing: Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 seem to tell us that except in the simplest cases, any approximation will need too many resources to be of any practical value, as demonstrated by Table 1 and Table 2 .
Fortunately, not all is lost. If we resort to pairwise comparison, we may restrict ourselves to the extreme points of the closure of the convex hull of the credal set, which can be much smaller than the original credal set. Closing the credal set only has an arbitrary small effect on maximality, and in part for this reason, it turns out that approximating extreme points suffices when restricting to pairwise preference.
I wish to emphasise that the bounds on the cardinalities of the approximating partition and the approximating credal set are only upper bounds under very weak assumptions. These bounds are only attained in extreme situations. In many cases the credal set and the loss function have additional structure which may allow for much lower upper bounds.
In case the problem has sufficient structure, an alternative approach is to develop algorithms which do not need to traverse the complete credal set (or an approximation thereof) to compute the optimal solution. The imprecise Dirichlet model has already been given considerable attention in this direction [7] .
Obermeier and Augustin [10] have described a method to approximate decision problems by applying Luceños' adaptive discretisation method to either all elements of the credal set (so the partition varies with the distribution), or on a reference distribution of that set. This type of approximation aims to preserve the first r moments of a distribution. Although precise convergence results and bounds on the precision of this approximation have not yet been proven, examples have shown that this method can yield good results in practice.
Finally, another approach could consist of sampling elements from the credal set, for instance through Monte-Carlo techniques, and solve a classical decision problem for each of these elements. If the sample s fromM is large enough, then-since P ∈s opt(A, The question how large a sample we need to ensure convergence is definitely worth further investigation.
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Appendix A. Discretisation Of The Standard Simplex In R n In this appendix a simple discretisation of ∆ n , the standard simplex in R n , is studied-these results are not new and are in fact related to well known notions from combinatorics, in particular multisets [15] . The standard simplex ∆ n is defined as 
